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INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act' in 1925 to
quash judicial speculation that American courts would not enforce

*Editor's Note: This Note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for
the best student note submitted in the Fall 1987.
Author's Note: I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents, Bob and Ruth Chastain,
who have given me much love and support, and have made law school possible for me.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1987).
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private arbitration agreements. 2 Before the 1925 Act, courts held that

public policy3 prohibited enforcing unofficial persons' contractually

created private dispute resolutions. 4 Although Congress elevated arbitration agreements to "the same footing as other contracts,"' Congress

failed to fully delineate procedures by which the federal policy favoring
arbitration6 could occur. Parties to the arbitration agreement, courts,

7
and arbitrators struggle with practical difficulties such as preemption,
statutory claims' arbitrability,5 and power allocation between courts

and arbitrators regarding default, 9 laches, 10 and time-bar defenses.',
A newer arbitration issue is whether the United States Arbitration
Act grants federal courts the power to consolidate arbitrable claims
embodied in separate contracts when the disputes arise out of a single
transaction, and the parties refuse to consolidate the proceedings.12

2. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
3. See infra notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979) (arbitration is an informal dispute resolution
process where parties stipulate in advance to refer disputes to third person(s) for resolution
and parties agree to follow the award after third person(s) holds a hearing).
5. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
6. Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1025 (11th Cir. 1982).
7. See, e.g., Atwood, Issues in Federal-StateRelations Underthe FederalArbitrationAct,
37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61 (1985); Note, Preemption of State Law Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 129 (1985); Comment, Commercial Arbitration: Southland Corp. v.
Keating - Section 2 of the Federal ArbitrationAct Preempts State Law in the Field of Commercial Arbitration, 10 J. CORP. L. 767 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (customers could properly arbitrate disputes under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and any
RICO claims); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(international antitrust claims were arbitrable); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (parties
may not arbitrate disputes regarding the Securities Act of 1933). See also Bedell, Harrison &
Grant, Arbitrability:Current Developments in the Interpretationand Enforceabilityof Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1987) (discussing traditionally problematic statutory
areas in arbitration law such as the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
antitrust, RICO, and bankruptcy).
9. See Calkins, Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate:An Issue for the Court or the Arbitrator?,
ARB.J., Mar. 1982, at 10, 3 (generally, the court determines if party waived arbitration when
party participates in actions at law).
10. Id. at 12 (arbitrator determines if party has waived arbitration because of excessive
delay).
11. Id. at 13 (arbitrator determines if party failed to comply with express time limit in the
contract). See, e.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023, 1028 (11th
Cir. 1982) (arbitrator determines if request for arbitration is made timely as provided by the
contract terms).
12. Compare Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.) (a
court may not consolidate arbitration), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984) vith Sociedad Anonima
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This note explores whether federal courts may consolidate arbitration agreements among non-consenting parties, or if the arbitrator
must decide to consolidate. The note begins with a historical perspective of arbitration, and next describes the differing approaches to the
consolidation issue. The note further explores problems each approach
presents, and suggests solutions compatible with each approach.

II.

HISTORY OF ARBITRATION

A.

English Common Law

Before Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act in 1925,
American courts reluctantly followed the English common law's refusal
to recognize private agreements to arbitrate. 13 English courts enforced
arbitration agreements after controversies ripened into awards, 14 but
refused to enforce the arbitration process while agreements were
merely executory. 15 Thus, English courts refused to specifically enforce
arbitration agreements or stay contemporaneous judicial proceedings
in courts of equity.16 The English judiciary believed arbitration violated
public policy by ousting courts' jurisdiction; 7 thdrefore, the courts'
jealousy barred enforcement of arbitration contracts.' 8
B.

Early American Arbitration

Early American courts accepted English precedent, refusing to
enforce agreements to arbitrate or refusing to bar simultaneous judicial
proceedings because of an arbitration agreement. 9 Various policies
supported the American courts' refusal to compel the arbitration pro-

de Navegacion Petrolera v. CIA. de Petroleos de Chile S.A., 634 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(court may consolidate arbitration) and Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 611 F.
Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court may not consolidate arbitration, but it may make consolidation
easier for the arbitrator to effectuate).
13. See United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915). See also Note, The New Federal ArbitrationLaw, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 270
(1926) [hereinafter New Law].
14. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 (2d Cir.
1942).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 983.
17. Id. Commentators suggested that the judges feared a loss of income resulting from
arbitration ousting the court's jurisdiction. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924
19. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065).
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cess.20 A primary reason focused on arbitration agreements' inchoate
character. Courts would face problems enforcing executory agreements when the parties failed to outline arbitration procedures. 2 1 Common law's antagonism towards enforcing arbitration agreements also
left the arbitrator powerless to investigate a grievance because the
arbitrator lacked power to subpeona witnesses and discover evidence
without a specific grant of authority.22
American courts eventually recognized arbitration agreements'
value.2 However, these courts felt bound by English courts' precedential hostility towards arbitration.? Although American courts criticized
the old-fashioned rule, they refused to enforce arbitration agreements
without a legislative policy change.?
C. CongressionalValidation of Arbitration
Congress addressed the American arbitration problem in 1925. Citing New York's statutory success legitimizing the arbitration process, 26
Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act. Although the
Act's legislative history is relatively sparse, Congress stated several
reasons for its passage. First, Congress abolished the "very old law
that the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would not
be enforced in equity." Congress diverged from the common law

20. See, e.g., United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006,
1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements for the following reasons:
the contract is revocable, the contract is against public policy, the arbitration clause is merely
collateral to the main contract and thus may be disregarded, private parties may not diminish
statutorily created judicial power, and arbitration is only a condition precedent to a lawsuit.).
21. Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1319 (addressing the inchoate nature of arbitration agreements;
for example, how, when, and to whom are the grievances submitted?).
22. Id. at 1321. The court also feared that each party's legal rights may not be fully
protected during arbitration. Id.
23. See United States Asphalt Ref. Co., 222 F. at 1007. By this time, England had created
the English Arbitration Act of 1889 (Chapter 49, 52-53 Victoria) to validate arbitration agreements. Id.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1012 (court would not enforce the arbitration agreement even though
'nferior courts may fail to find convincing reasons" for the common law rule).
25. Id. at 1011 (the court calls upon the New York Legislature or Congress to modernize
arbitration law). See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) (noting courts believed
the precedent was "too strongly fixed" to be overturned without legislative enactment); New
Law, supra note 13, at 283 (arguing American courts "did not feel themselves free" to begin
enforcing arbitration agreements).
26. See S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). See also 1920 N.Y. Laws 275
(Congress modeled the United States Arbitration Act after the New York Act).
27. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
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because arbitration panels needed the means to grant full redress,
courts should not be jealous of losing jurisdiction over disputes,2 and
the old rule lacked reason in modern society.2 A second reason is
based upon equitable principles. 30 If the parties carefully drafted an
arbitration agreement and subsequently honored it, Congress would
not have created the Act.3 1 However, parties more commonly escaped
arbitration agreements rather than honoring them. 2 Because the
judiciary lacked power to enforce arbitration provisions, the breaching
party frequently escaped punishment.w When Congress placed arbitration agreements on the same level as other contract provisions,
parties could no longer escape arbitration promises when performance
became disadvantageous. 4 Thus, courts had power to specifically enforce arbitration agreements like any other contract provision against
a breaching party.3 Specific performance may be the only true remedy
for arbitration agreements because compensatory damages are generally deemed insufficient. Finally, Congress desired to expedite grievance resolution 7 Congress validated private dispute resolution as an
alternative to litigation to minimize technicalities, delay, and expenses8 The Act allows the expert arbitrator to settle a grievance
quickly 39 and to minimize judicial interference. 40 Parties will more likely

28. Cf. New Law, supra note 13, at 282 (attorneys should not fear loss of fees due to the
Arbitration Act since well informed attorneys regarding the Act will be in high demand).
29. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1924).
30. See New Law, supra note 13, at 269-70 (general discussion of the creation of specific
enforcement remedies for arbitration agreements).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
35. New Law, supra note 13, at 278.
36. Id.
37. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). See also Atwood, supra note
7, at 76 (legislative history reveals Congress' desire to regulate federal court procedure in
enforcing arbitration agreements); New Law, supra note 13, at 269 (judicial economy and expedition of the grievance procedure were Congress' primary motivations in passing the Act). But
see Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (Congress' primary motivation
in creating the Arbitration Act was to enforce the parties' arbitration agreements; judicial
economy was a secondary consideration that is served once the arbitration clauses were held
valid by courts of law).
38. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
39. See, e.g., New Law, supra note 13, at 269 ("in the ordinary jury trial, the parties do
not have the benefit of the judgment of persons familiar with the peculiarities of the given
controversy").
40. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924) ("If the parties to the arbitration
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be satisfied with an arbitrator's award because the arbitrator's decision
41
uses the parties' relevant community standards.
D. Provisions of the Act
The United States Arbitration Act remains substantially unchanged
since its enactment.4 The Act's provisions reflect Congress' authority
to create arbitration processes through its power to regulate admiralty,
interstate commerce, and tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. 43
The Act declares that agreements arbitrating maritime or commercial
disputes shall be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.""
The Act also provides for a stay in judicial proceedings upon a party's
application if a court finds an arbitration agreement exists."5 Section
4 of the Act empowers courts to compel arbitration after a party
petitions a United States district court. 46 The court shall compel arbi47
tration after determining that an agreement to arbitrate is not at issue.
The court then shall order the "parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement."' Finally,
the Act addresses issues that previously prevented courts from enforcing arbitration agreements. 49 These issues include arbitrator selection,w subpeona powers, 51 judicial confirmation of an arbitrator's

are willing to proceed under it, they need not resort to the courts at all . . . . Machinery is
provided for the prompt determination of his claim for arbitration and the arbitration proceeds
without interference by the court.").
41. See New Law, supra note 13, at 269 (the business and maritime communities desired
adjudications commensurate with each community's respective standards).
42. See S. REP. No. 2498, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in, 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3991, 3998 (Congress made technical changes to § 4 of the Act).
43. See New Law, supra note 13, at 275. See also Hirshman, The Second Arbitration
Trilogy: The Federalizationof Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1314-15 (1985).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
45. Id. at § 3.
46. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1954).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Healy, An Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MAR. L. &
Com. 223, 224-30 (1982) (discusses each section of the Act).
50. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1947) (section 5 gives effect to parties' chosen method to select arbitrators;
if a contract is silent, a court may select arbitrators on a party's petition).
51. 9 U.S.C. at § 7 (1951) (arbitrator may petition district court to compel attendance of
witness or hold witness in contempt).
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award,6 judicial revocation of a fraudulent awardp and judicial modification of an incorrect arbitration award.5 Congress addressed some
of the common law's criticisms of private agreements to arbitrate, but
the Act failed to answer all the practical administrative matters arising
since its enactment. 5
III. THE CONSOLIDATION CONFLICT
Since Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act, recalcitrant parties to arbitration agreements sought various methods to
avoid their contractual agreement. Generally, disputes over administration of procedural rather than substantive arbitration issues have
abounded. 6 Currently, the circuits are split whether courts have power
to consolidate arbitration proceedings among non-consenting parties. 7
The courts have developed three theories. First, a court may not
consolidate arbitration among non-consenting parties. S Second, a court
has the inherent power to consolidate proceedings arising out of a
single transaction. 9 Finally, the third theory, a hybrid of the first

52. 9 U.S.C. at § 9 (1947) (if non-prevailing party refuses to honor arbitrator's award,
prevailing party may petition court to enter an order confirming arbitration award).
53. Id. at § 10 (court may vacate arbitrator's award if "the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," or the arbitrators were corrupt or biased, or the arbitrators
misbehaved during the proceedings so as to prejudice a party's rights, or the arbitrators exceeded
their powers such as overstepping the subject matter of arbitration). See also Healy, supra
note 49, at 230 (Section 10 will not overturn arbitration award based only upon a technicality;
defect must be substantive in nature, such as an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1947) (district court may correct or modify arbitration award where
arbitrators miscalculated the amount or erred in another matter not affecting the dispute's
merits).
55. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987) (courts
may consolidate only if interrelated nature of the contracts impute consent of parties to arbitration); Weyehaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.) (courts may
not consolidate arbitration without consent of parties), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984); Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975) (courts
may consolidate arbitration). One illustration of the problem involves an arbitration clause in a
contract with the owner and the contractor, and another arbitration clause in a separate contract
between the contractor and the subcontractor. If a dispute arises triggering one of the arbitration
agreements, must the interested third person join the arbitration proceedings absent his consent?
See, e.g., Maxun Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086, 1086-87 (4th Cir. 1987).
58. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
59. See Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966,
974-75 (2d Cir. 1975).
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two theories, holds that a court may consolidate arbitration proceedings if it determines that all parties consented due to broadly drafted
arbitration clauses. 0
A. Courts May Not Consolidate Arbitration
The Ninth Circuit holds that the judiciary may not compel consolidation of arbitrable claims when contracts are silent regarding consolidation, and the parties do not consent.6 1Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western
Seas Shipping Co.6 is a maritime case involving an arbitration clause
between the ship owner, Trans-Pacific Shipping Co., and the time
charterer, Weyerhaeuser.6 In the contract, the parties agreed to arbitrate Weyerhaeuser's right to indemnity if a third party recovered
damages in another arbitration proceeding.6 A separate contract between Weyerhaeuser and the sub-charterer, Karlander, contained a
standard maritime arbitration clause to settle disputes for loss or
damage to the ship or cargo.6 A dispute arose between Karlander
and Weyerhaeuser regarding Weyerhaeuser's alleged unreasonable neglect in examining the storage area.6 Weyerhaeuser sought to consolidate its arbitration proceedings with Trans-Pacific on the indemnity
issue and Weyerhaeuser's negligence dispute with Karlander. 67
Weyerhaeuser asserted that federal courts could compel the parties
to consolidate arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act.6
On appeal, the court adopted the trial court's reasoning and.refused to compel consolidation.70 The court stated that the United States
Arbitration Act limited the judiciary's power to oversee arbitration

60. See Maxum, 817 F.2d at 1087 ("No arbitration shall include by consolidation, joinder
or in any other manner, parties other than the Owner, the Contractorand any other persons
substantially involved in a common question of fact or law, whose presence is required if
complete relief is to be accorded in the arbitration.")(emphasis in original).
61. See Weyerhaeuser, 743 F.2d at 635.
62. Id.

63.
64.
65.

Id.at 636.
Id.
Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Id.

68. Id. Weyerhaeuser Co. cited Compania Espanola de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping,
S.A., 527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975) for support. Id. at 636-37.
69. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 568 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
70. 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984).
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procedures. 71 Section 4 of the Act only allows courts to determine
whether an arbitration agreement exists.7' If an agreement exists, the
court shall order the parties to arbitrate according to the arbitration
agreement terms. 73 This holding recognizes that arbitration is based
on the parties' contract, which determines the forum and procedure
for grievance adjudication. 74 In dictum, the court stated that its decision might have been different if the parties had consented to consoli7 The court, however, found no implied consent
dation in the contracts.
76
in the instant case.

The Fifth Circuit in Del E. Webb Constructionv. RichardsonHospital Authority7' adopted the Weyerhaeuser rationale and decided that
courts may not consolidate arbitration without a contract specifically
authorizing judicial action. 7s The court also acknowledged that the
Arbitration Act required the judiciary to vigorously enforce arbitration
agreements,79 even if the result is "piecemeal litigation. ' 0 The court
further held that "once it is determined . . . that the parties are

obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration,
'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its
final disposition should be left to the arbitrator."s' The court concluded
that the judiciary could not compel consolidation because contract provisions explicitly rejected consolidation between the owner, contractor,
and architect. Because section 4 of the Act limits the court's power
to enforce the arbitration agreement's terms,1' the court could not
consolidate arbitration as a matter of congressional mandate. 84
71. Id. The circuit court declined to follow the Second Circuit's case law cited by
Weyerhaeuser. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Thus, the Act circumscribes the court's power to only determine if an agreement
exists, and then to compel arbitration. Id.
74. d.
75. Id.
76. Id. The circuit court distinguished its holding from Nereus by stating that the parties
in Nereus signed an addendum implying their consent to consolidation. Id.
77. 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987). In Webb Constr., the owner and architect signed a standard
contract agreeing to arbitrate any disputes arising during construction, and the owner and
contractor signed a similar standard contract. Id. at 146-47.
78. Id. at 150.
79. Id. at 148.
80. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
81. Id. at 149 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964)).
82. Id. at 150.
83. Id.
84. Id. Cf. Bay County Bldg. Auth. v. Spence Bros., 140 Mich. App. 182, 186-88, 362
N.W.2d 739, 742 (1984) (courts may not consolidate under state arbitration act); Pueblo of
Laguna v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 101 N.M. 341, 344, 682 P.2d 197, 200 (1984) (court would not
consolidate under state arbitration act).
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Courts May ConsolidateArbitration

The second arbitration consolidation theory is discussed in CompaniaEspanola de Petroleosv. Nereus Shipping. 5 This maritime case
involved an arbitration agreement between Nereus (the owners) and
Hideca (the charterers). An addendum to the contract provided that
Cepsa, the charterers' guarantors, would perform the balance of the
contract if Hideca defaulted7 Although Nereus and Hideca clearly
obligated themselves to arbitrate disputes, Cepsa's obligation to arbitrate remained uncertain 8 The Second Circuit upheld the district
court's finding that Cepsa agreed to arbitrate 9 and upheld the consolidation of arbitration proceedings.9 The circuit court reasoned that the
parties' rights were safeguarded in the equitable proceeding, which
determined the parties' intent to consolidate, because they had the
opportunity to present evidence. 91 The court stated that consolidation
served justice. Common questions of law and fact existed in both
arbitrations, and Hideca could avoid conflicting findings on the default
issue in a consolidated proceeding.Y The circuit court based its authority to consolidate arbitration on the liberal purposes behind the Arbitration Act9 and on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a) and
81(a)(3).9 Rule 81(a)(3) states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to Title 9 arbitration only when the statute does not discuss
procedural matters. 95 Title 9 does not mention consolidation. Rule 42(a)
allows courts to consolidate actions involving common questions of law
or fact to avoid unnecessary expense or delay.9 Thus, the court held
that the trial court correctly consolidated arbitration.9 7
Several district court cases accept the Nereus principle, and
suggest additional factors courts should consider when consolidating
arbitration.9 The first consideration to compel consolidation is when

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

527 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
Id. at 968-69.
Id. at 969-70.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 971 (district court only intended to determine that Cepsa agreed to arbitrate).
Id.
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id. at 975.
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3).
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).

97. Nereus, 527 F.2d at 975.
98. See Elmarina, Inc. v. Comexas, N.V., 679 F. Supp. 388, 390-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (court
upholds Nereus despite contrary case law in other circuits); Cable Belt Conveyors, Inc. v.
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one party has greater access to relevant information.9 Another factor
is whether a party opposing consolidation can show prejudice to the
case which outweighs the advantages of a consolidated hearing. 1' ° Finally, consolidation should occur before substantive arbitration on the
merits begins, and the United States Arbitration Act allows courts
to intervene before arbitration begins.1°1 These additional considerations place consolidation in a preferred position due to the practicality
of adjudicating all parties' rights simultaneously.10
C.

Contract Interpretationas a Means for
Court-OrderedConsolidation

Some courts take a middle approach to consolidation. 1 3 These
courts recognize that section 4 of the Act does not specifically empower

the judiciary to consolidate arbitrable claims, yet consolidation would

Alumina Partners of Jamaica, 669 F. Supp. 577, 579-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (consolidation in appropriate circumstances accomplishes the liberal purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act and avoids
inconsistent findings); Sociedad Anonima de Navegacion Petrolera v. CIA. de Petroleos de Chile,
S.A., 634 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (court found nothing in the Supreme Court's
holding in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), requiring piecemeal ligitation
that overrules Nereus's holding allowing court-ordered consolidation in proper circumstances);
Transportacion Maritina Mexicana, S.A. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, 636 F.
Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (courts have power to consolidate); Marine Trading Ltd. v. Ore
Int'l Corp., 432 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (federal arbitration statute authorizes court-ordered consolidation even over party's objection).
99. See Marine Trading Ltd. v. Ore Int'l Corp., 432 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
100. See Sociedad Anonima de Navegacion Petrolera v. CIA. de Petroleos de Chile, S.A.,
634 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (the standard is prejudice, not party's desire to have
dispute heard separately). See also Robinson v. Warner, 370 F. Supp. 828, 831 (D.R.I. 1974)
(balancing test for prejudice).
101. See Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd
Brasileiro, 636 F. Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ('The Federal Arbitration Act permits judicial
intervention before the arbitration begins and after the award has been rendered. There is no
statutory authority for judicial intervention during the course of arbitration proceedings.").
102. Cf. Laborer's Int'l Union v. W.W. Bennett Constr. Co., 686 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir.
1982) (courts may consolidate arbitration in labor disputes); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 414 F.2d 1326, 1329 (2d Cir. 1969) (court-ordered
consolidation of labor disputes); James Stewart Polshek & Assocs. v. Bergen County Iron Works,
142 N.J. Super. 516, 525-29, 362 A.2d 63, 68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976) (court-ordered
consolidation under New Jersey arbitration act); Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp., 26 N.Y.2d
157, 257 N.E.2d 624, 309 N.Y.S.2d 165 (New York courts may consolidate under state arbitration
act), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
103. See, e.g., Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987); Ore &
Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Higley S., Inc. v.
Park Shore Dev., 494 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle,
Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 16, 481 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), affd, 98 N.J. 266,
486 A.2d 334 (1985).
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provide the most efficient and practical disposition of the disputes.'04
These courts take a hybrid approach and construe the parties' broad
arbitration clauses to authorize courts to consolidate the claims.10 5
The Fourth Circuit used this approach in Maxum Foundationsv.
Salus Corp.'1° The 8201 Corporation (8201) owned an office development and agreed with Salus to perform general contracting work. 7
108
Salus contracted with Maxum Foundations to install the foundation.
Each contract contained an arbitration agreement.2 9 Grievances later
erupted and arbitration proceedings began as provided by the contract
between Salus and Maxum. 10 Salus moved for consolidation to bring
8201 into the same proceeding."'
The circuit court compelled consolidation because each contract
contained the same broad clause: "No arbitration shall include by consolidation ... parties other than the Owner, the Contractor and any
other persons substantially involved in a common question of fact or
law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded
in the arbitration.""2 The court concluded that both contracts "conferred rights and imposed obligations on all three parties."' The court
consolidated because of the interrelated nature of the parties' con-

tracts. "14
The Southern District of New York took another approach to consolidate arbitration in Ore & Chemical Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc."s
The court appointed the same arbitrator for two separate proceedings." 6 The trial court ultimately concluded that section 4 of the Act
does not give courts power to force consolidation, but does not prevent
courts from enabling arbitrators to consolidate easily. 117 In Ore &

104. See cases cited supra note 103.
105. Id.
106. 817 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1987).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1086-87 (arbitration began after Maxum instituted various actions in federal
district court).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 1088.
115. Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
modifying, 606 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
116. Id. at 237.
117. Id. at 241.
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Chemical Corp., OCC purchased oil from SOG."1 8 The contract contained a broad arbitration agreement.1 9 OCC then contracted to sell
the oil to Stinnes,2O and included a broad arbitration clause in their
contract.2 1 The dispute arose when SOG failed to deliver the oil to
OCC, causing OCC to fail to deliver the oil to Stinnes. 12 OCC desired
consolidation because common issues of fact and law existed, and they
faced the potential prejudice of inconsistent verdicts if the two proceedings remained separate.m
The trial court held when arbitration agreements do not provide for
consolidation, section 4 of the Act does not authorize court orders to
compel consolidated arbitration.12 The trial court also reasoned that
federal policy mandated this result "because the relevant federal law
requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement."'2 The court concluded that arbitrators, not
courts, must decide procedural matters.m
A few months later, OCC petitioned the court to appoint one arbitrator to preside at both the OCC-SOG and OCC-Stinnes proceedings.m The court granted OCC's request because appointing one arbitrator to both proceedings was consistent with each contract.m The
court determined that the arbitration clauses expressed the parties'
belief that a single arbitrator familiar with both transactions could
most easily settle the dispute.m One arbitrator would also better
determine if consolidation is the preferred procedure.130 This middle
approach neither grants carte blanche authority on courts to consolidate nor prevents court ordered consolidation in all circumstances.13

118.

606 F. Supp. 1510, 1511.

119. Id. at 1512.
120. Id. at 1511-12.
121. Id. at 1511. The contract stated: "Laws of the State of New York to govern with
arbitration in New York" Id.
122. Id. at 1511-12.
123. Id. at 1512.
124. Id. at 1513.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 1515. "It is more efficient to let the arbitrators, the ones who will be deciding
the merits of the matter, decide how the issues are to be adjudicated." Id.
127. Ore & Chem. Corp. v. Stinnes Interoil, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 237,239 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
128. Id. at 241.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Cf. Higley S., Inc. v. Park Shore Dev., 494 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1986)
("the authority of a trial court to consolidate arbitration proceedings must be found in at least
one of three sources, i.e., a statute, judicial policy or contract"); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L.
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ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EACH CONSOLIDATION
APPROACH

Congress enacted Title 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 for many reasons.r Congress desired to abrogate the common law hostility towards arbitration
agreements by validating provisions for private dispute resolution. 13
Congress believed courts should specifically enforce arbitration agreements rather than allow the breaching party to avoid the promise
when performance became disadvantageous. T3 Congress also recognized speedy dispute resolution in private forums was desirable. 135
The various approaches to consolidation each implement Congress'
intent. Courts refusing to consolidate arbitration emphasize that the
legislative intent legitimizes the arbitration contract. 136 Courts consolidating arbitration emphasize that Congress desires to provide efficient dispute resolution. 137 Finally, courts interpreting the contract as
implicitly authorizing consolidation attempt to balance enforcing the
arbitration contract with creating efficient dispute resolution. 138 Because Congress failed to prioritize its reasons for the Arbitration Act,
the differing consolidation approaches validly emphasize a particular
legislative intent to support varying conclusions.
Although each view has merit, several other considerations affect
the arbitration process. First, parties create arbitration by contract.139
Generally, parties arbitrate only what they contractually agreed to
arbitrate. 140 Second, arbitration works well only in a consensual atmosphere.141 Unlike a judicial process where a party unwillingly partakes
in a proceeding, the arbitration process is created before a problem

Muscarelle, Inc., 196 N.J. Super. 16, 481 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (New
Jersey arbitration laws require that arbitration decide procedural issues, although the trend is
moving towards judicial consolidation of arbitration in appropriate circumstances), affd, 98 N.J.
266, 486 A.2d 334 (1985).
132. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1924).
133. S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
134. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1924).
135. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1924).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 103-26.
139. See supra text accompanying note 74.
140. See, e.g., AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 106 S. Ct. 1415,
1418 (1986).
141. See Rubino-Sammartano, Multi Party Arbitration, 9 INI'L Bus. L. 436, 437 (1981).
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exists. Parties create the informal arbitration procedure to avoid litigation.'4 Third, parties choose arbitration for reasons peculiar to the
transaction. For instance, private dispute resolution may be preferred
to litigation, an arbitrator's expertise in the relevant business community may be preferred to the views of a judge and jury, or arbitration's
speed and efficiency may be preferred to clogged court dockets and
delaying pre-trial motions.'- The effects of collateral estoppel or the
delaying effect of an arbitrator's award could place one party in poten-

tially inconsistent positions.'" Although courts dispute whether the
collateral estoppel doctrine applies to private dispute forums,145 inconsistent arbitration awards still place the party in a difficult position.
Resolving inconsistent awards only increases the delay the parties

originally sought to avoid. Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled on
analogous procedural situations, although it has not specifically addressed consolidation. 4 6 Thus, particular considerations justify each approach to consolidation based on the facts of each case.
A.

Courts May Not Consolidate Arbitration

Courts refusing to consolidate arbitration emphasize Congress' intent to validate and enforce arbitration agreements. 147 These courts
also emphasize enforcing the contract's terms. '1 The Supreme Court
stated that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed

so to submit.' 4 9 Section 4 of the Act compels judicial deference to the
contract,"5 but if the agreement does not address specific procedures,
then determining arbitration procedure will be difficult.

142. See, e.g., New Law, supra note 13, at 269.
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying note 92. See also Brownko Int'l, Inc. v. Ogden Steel
Co., 585 F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consolidated arbitration's primary benefit is
avoiding the "danger of conflicting findings"). These additional reasons fill gaps that Congress
overlooked when it created the Arbitration Act in 1925. See also Cable Belt Conveyors, Inc.
v. Alumina Partners of Jamaica, 669 F. Supp. 577, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (separate arbitration
proceedings may result in inconsistent findings).
145. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985) (the preclusive
effect of arbitration proceedings is not settled).
146. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 9, at 10.
147. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). See also supra text accompanying notes 44 & 69-76.
148. See supratext accompanying note 74; see also Morgan, ContractTheory and the Sources
of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1059 (1987).
149. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1954).
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Courts refusing to consolidate enforce arbitration agreements by
limiting the judiciary's power. These courts only allow courts to determine if an arbitration agreement exists, and then compel arbitration
as the parties' contract provides. 151 The Supreme Court has generally
stated that the arbitrator decides substantive and procedural issues
while hearing the dispute because section 4 of the Act limits courts'
power. 152 However, this general proposition has not been easily accomplished.'5
Without legislative guidance, courts have difficulty distinguishing
courts' and arbitrators' authority regarding substantive and procedural
aspects of arbitration. Arbitrators clearly have power to decide substantive issues in arbitration proceedings, 55 but specific procedural
issues have not been as clear. The United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston. 155 The
Court acknowledged that disputes are not easily separated into "procedural" and "substantive" categories. However, "once it is determined
• . . that the parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a
dispute to arbitration, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the
dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitrator."'' 1 The Court also stated that courts could deny arbitration if
the procedural claim completely bars, rather than limits or modifies,
the arbitration process. 157 These rare procedural cases are within the
court's jurisdiction.'
Since Wiley, lower courts have struggled to apply its general principle to specific situations.' 59 Courts generally first determine if an
arbitration agreement exists, and then allow the arbitrator to resolve
procedural issues.'r5 Consolidation, like other procedural issues such
as waiver, may be subject to Wiley's language. Consolidation alone
will not bar arbitration at the outset, however, it may modify the

151. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
152. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
153. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
154. See Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd
Brasiliero, 636 F. Supp. 474, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (courts may not interfere with substantive
arbitration process).
155. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
156. Id. at 557 (procedure may affect substantive merits).
157. Id. at 558.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 7-12 & 153 and accompanying text.
160. Id.
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arbitration process by adding new parties to those originally included
in the contract. Thus, applying Wiley to consolidation implies that
courts lack power to consolidate arbitration proceedings.
Recent trends indicate that courts prefer enforcing arbitration agreements rather than resorting to the courts. Certain statutory grievances previously unamenable to arbitration are now allowed in proper
circumstances. 161 The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the theory that complex issues are not well adapted to arbitration. 112 The Court also prefers piece-meal litigation to not enforcing
arbitration contracts because of the overriding federal policy favoring
arbitration.16
The Court extended judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements
regardless of the efficiency costs in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd.'3 The Court held that section 4 divests the district courts'
discretion regarding arbitration in cases involving "intertwined" arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims.' Even though Congress did not
anticipate bifurcated proceedings, a district court must sever and then
compel arbitration of arbitrable claims to enforce the parties' contract.'6 The Court concluded that Congress primarily intended to ensure judicial enforcement of private arbitration agreements. 67 The
Court rejected expeditious claim resolution as Congress' overriding
goal,'6 but acknowledged that enforcing arbitration agreements eases
the judiciary's dockets and serves the secondary goal of efficiency.6 9
The view disapproving arbitration consolidation, therefore, finds support in Congress' primary desire to validate arbitration contracts and
in analogous "procedural/substantive" case law.
Additional considerations suggest that courts may not consolidate
arbitration. The first consideration is based on the premise that arbi-

161.

See, e.g., ShearsordAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987) (arbi-

tration is proper for resolving Rule 10b-5 and RICO disputes); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration is an appropriate dispute resolution

for certain anti-trust issues).
162. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 633-34 (1985).
163. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983).
164. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
165. Id. at 217. The doctrine of intertwining occurs when arbitrable and non-arbitrable
claims arise from the same transaction, and the legal and factual issues are so inseparable that
the court may deny arbitration and try all the claims in federal court. Id. at 216.
166. Id. at 217.
167. Id. at 219.
168. Id. at 218-19.
169. Id. at 219-20.
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tration works in a consensual atmosphere. Compelling arbitration undermines arbitration's effectiveness; thus, courts should not force consolidated arbitration on unwilling parties. Additionally, parties may
refuse consolidation for reasons peculiar to a particular transaction.
This view, however, ignores other considerations important to the
arbitration process. One consideration is the value of efficiency. Additionally, although the Supreme Court stated that efficient dispute
resolution is secondary to contract enforcement,170 this conclusion ignores the fundamental contract principle of enforcing the parties' intent. Parties to two distinct contracts could include consolidation
clauses. However, if they fail to outline every possible contingency,
they do not necessarily intend to subject themselves to inefficient,
duplicative proceedings. Although the arbitrator may decide the procedural consolidation issue after reviewing the facts, court ordered
consolidation at the outset would save time. If a party does not expressly consent to consolidation once a dispute arises, the party does
not necessarily intend to preclude efficient dispute resolution during
the contract's execution. The view prohibiting courts from consolidating arbitration also reads Byrd too broadly. The Supreme Court authorized the inefficiency of separate arbitration and judicial proceedings,'7' but did not discuss the separation of two arbitration proceedings. Consolidating two separate arbitration proceedings meets the
goal of enforcing arbitration contracts. The Act does not specifically
require separation to validate arbitration agreements. A final consideration is that one party may be subject to inconsistent awards, which
may further delay resolution of the dispute and adversely effect the
parties' transaction.72
B.

Courts May Consolidate Arbitration

Courts consolidating arbitration agreements emphasize efficient
dispute resolution in responding to the maritime and business communities' demand for speedy judgments relative to the communities'
respective standards. 173 Judicial authority to consolidate is found in
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3), providing that the rules
apply to Title 9 proceedings when Title 9 is otherwise silent. 174 Because

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
See
See
See
See

at 219.
supra text accompanying notes 165-70.
supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
New Law, supra note 13, at 269.
supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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the Arbitration Act fails to address arbitration procedure, courts may
invoke Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a) to consolidate arbitration.17
Courts consolidating arbitration reason that consolidation efficiently
resolves complex grievances,176 and avoids inconsistent verdicts.17 Consolidating complex grievances effectuates the parties' intent to resolve
quickly disputes arising from the contract. For instance, parties may
wish to consolidate if the contract concerns volatile business transactions or if the parties desire efficiency above all other considerations.
Consolidation also avoids inconsistent awards. 178
Although the Supreme Court recognized that collateral estoppel's
role is not settled in arbitration proceedings, the Court implied that
collateral estoppel would not apply because arbitration is not a court
process.17 9 Thus, a party facing inconsistent awards does not have the
additional onus of adverse collateral estoppel consequences prejudicing
further litigation. Collateral estoppel may not apply to arbitration,
however, a party receiving inconsistent decisions in separate proceedings cannot abide by one award without violating the other. Inconsistent awards could only be resolved in another arbitration forum or
through litigation. However, additional proceedings settling inconsistent findings may add further delay to the dispute resolution process
and ignore the parties' original intent of efficient dispute resolution.
Consolidation, therefore, provides a practical method to resolve efficiently all interrelated disputes at one time. 80
Arbitration, as a litigation substitute, can become unmanageable
due to the risk of inconsistent verdicts or other unforeseen circumstances.181 Consolidation may be an appropriate solution to effectuate efficient dispute resolution; however, efficiency alone does not
authorize district courts to compel consolidation. Compelling consolidation is 'in conflict with the contractual - and therefore voluntary
basis of arbitration."'1' Parties voluntarily arbitrate, and agree in advance how to resolve disputes arising out of a contract. 18 Compelling

175.' See supra text accompanying notes 94-97.
176. See supra text accompanying note 92.

177.
178.

Id.
Id.

179.
180.

See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985).
See supra text accompanying notes 92-102.

181. Cf. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960) ("There
are too many people, too many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies to make the
words of the contract the exclusive source of rights and duties" for labor arbitration.).
182. Rubino-Sammartano, supra note 141, at 437.
183. See supra notes 74 & 148 and accompanying text.
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procedures that the parties did not agree to perform undermines the
effectiveness of the arbitration process. Furthermore, case law and
section 4 of the Act suggest that arbitrators, not courts, determine
pretermitted procedural arbitration issues. '8 Although a literal reading
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 81(a)(3) and 42(a) authorizes courts
to consolidate, the Supreme Court has not addressed the consolidation
issue in any "procedural/substantive" arbitration cases.
C.

Court Interpretation of the Contract Authorizes the Courts to
Consolidate

Courts consolidating arbitration because the contracts' interrelated
nature imply the parties' consent subscribe to both enforcing the arbitration agreement and efficient dispute resolution., These courts
recognize that section 4 of the Act limits the judiciary's involvement
in the arbitration process;' however, courts are authorized to consolidate when parties implicitly consent through broadly stated arbitration
agreements. 187

This middle approach is subject to both the advantages and disadvantages applicable to the previous views.188 However, this
middle route may be the approach least subject to criticism under the
status quo. Courts stay within their authority to interpret contract
provisions in determining whether an arbitration agreement exists,
and then compel arbitration according to the agreement's terms. Because the arbitration contract creates the parties' rights in the arbitration process, 18 court enforcement of the implied consent to consolidate is valid under the United States Arbitration Act. This middle
approach, however, further blurs the "substantive"/"procedural" distinction the Wiley Court attempted to delineate. 19° When courts interpret the contract to authorize consolidation, they determine procedural
issues potentially affecting the dispute's outcome. The Wiley Court
held that the arbitrator, not the court, determines these procedural
issues. Furthermore, when district courts stretch a broad arbitration
clause to its limits compelling consolidation, efficiency is served but
the parties' intent may not be given full effect.

184. See supra notes 9-11 & 71-73 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 103 & 124.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
188. See supra notes 139-46 & 154-71 & 178-84 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 148 & 183.
190. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/4

20

Chastain: Federal Circuit Conflict Regarding Consolidation of Arbitration
FEDERAL CONSOLIDATION OF ARBITRATION

D. Resolving the ConsolidationConflict
Problems abound with each approach to consolidating arbitration.
Without legislative enactment or a Supreme Court ruling, no solution
currently covers every situation because arbitration is fact-specific.
Because parties mutually consent to arbitration in their contract, the
ultimate source of each party's rights is found in that contract.' 9'
Consolidation is a difficult issue for the judiciary,192 and forces courts
to determine whether authority exists to consolidate multiple claims.
Many procedural issues have arisen since Congress passed the
Arbitration Act, but Congress has not refined the Act to address
specific issues of waiver, preemption, or consolidation. 193 Although an
amendment allocating procedural duties between the arbitrator and
the district court would immediately solve these issues, Congress cannot sufficiently address or foresee all the details of each situation.
Furthermore, Congress should not intrude upon the parties' right to
create and choose dispute resolution procedures.
A more immediate solution compatible with the Act's primary purpose' requires parties to outline specific procedures in the arbitration
agreement. Obviously, the parties cannot foresee and address every
potential problem in an arbitration clause, but a general understanding
of the ramifications of broad or narrow arbitration clauses in a particular judicial district could avoid surprise when disputes arise. 95 Unless
parties desire compelled consolidation, narrowly drafted arbitration
clauses should replace broad boilerplate arbitration clauses. 19 By
specifying their intent and consent to consolidation and other procedural issues, courts and arbitrators may not easily interfere with
the parties' contract. Although parties cannot foresee every situation,
parties to interrelated transactions can foresee possible multiple dis-

191. See supra text accompanying notes 74 & 148.
192. See Rubino-Sammartano, supra note 141, at 436.
193. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
194. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (the Act's primary
purpose is to enforce arbitration agreements).
195. See Lord, Arbitration in the United States, 8-9 MAR. L. 227, 229 (1983-84) (discussing
broad versus narrow arbitration clauses).
196. See, e.g., Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 817 F.2d 1086, 1087 (4th Cir. 1987)
(The contract stated, "No arbitration shall include by consolidation, joinder or in any other
manner, parties other than the Owner, the Contractor, and any other persons substantially
involved in a cormmon question,of fact or law.....") (emphasis in original); Compania Espanola
de Petroleos, S.A. v. Nereus Shipping, S.A., 527 F.2d 966, 969 (2d Cir. 1977) (arbitration clause
began "Any and all differences and disputes of whatsoever nature arising out of this charter
shall be put to arbitration .... 0%
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putes arising out of a single occurrence. Clearly in interrelated arbitration contracts, parties should address consolidation according to
their intent rather than having courts or arbitrators force consolidation. Using narrowly drafted clauses rather than broad arbitration
clauses also prevents a court from inferring the parties' intent to
consolidate. In any jurisdiction, the parties are in the best position to
protect their interests. 19
V.

THE FUTURE OF CONSOLIDATION

The arbitration procedure's future is uncertain because of the varying theories behind the Act's purpose. When Congress enacted Title
9, it desired to remedy judicial hostility towards enforcing arbitration
agreements by creating efficient dispute resolution. However, Congress failed to address the practicalities of enforcing arbitration. Parties to complex transactions should be aware of the various holdings
regarding consolidation to avoid unwanted procedures to resolve their
disputes. If the transaction requires speedy resolution, parties should
specifically authorize the district court to consolidate all claims arising
from the dispute. If, on the other hand, a party desires to confine
arbitration to the other party in the contract, the contract should
specifically forbid courts and arbitrators to consolidate. Parties in this
latter situation should beware of broad boilerplate arbitration clauses
because some courts interpret them as authorizing consolidation. Until
Congress amends the United States Arbitration Act to specify procedural rules, the parties to an arbitration agreement are best suited
to protect their interests rather than relying on tradition or their
unstated intent in the contracts.
Karen M. Chastain

197. See Oehmke, CommercialArbitrationSubmission Agreements: No More "Jack in the
Box," CASE & COM., Mar./Apr., 1988, at 3 (recommending arbitration clauses tailored to clients'
particular needs rather than blind reliance on the American Arbitration Association's standard
arbitration clause). This article explores many considerations pertinent to creating a contractual
arbitration clause. The drafter should consider the impact of deviating from the standard rules
to avoid surprises. Id. at 6.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss2/4

22

